This post will expand on some of the ideas presented in the topic synopsis, specifically those detailing the first failed peace negotiations within Darfur, in order to better prepare you delegates with the necessary context for the beginning of committee. Note that our timeline begins in 2006, following the failed passage of the Abuja Agreement -- this post will help clarify why the agreement failed and what steps the respective actors within Darfur took as a result. Using Abuelbashar's article, titled "On the Failure of Darfur Peace Talks in Abuja," this post will help illuminate the underlying flaws with the Abuja Agreement.
It is evidently clear that the conflict within Darfur stems from ethnic tensions instigated by the central government of Sudan; Khartoum's policies of marginalization have greatly disenfranchised those within the southern part of the country, and have set clear goals for rebel groups and militant actors in regards to the peace process. If anything has been made abundantly clear, it is that further military conflict is not the correct course of action needed to resolve the ongoing violence within Darfur. Rebel groups have been consistently aware of this fact, and even encourage diplomatic routes being taken. The SLM/A understands completely that peace talks and settlements are the correct course of action to ensure peace within Sudan. So why did the Abuja Agreement fail to accomplish this?
To start, the SLM/A approached the negotiation table with an open mind and high hopes that all parties would be able to discuss the roots of the conflict and determine an agreement that would be equitable for all actors. Mainly, the SLM/A hoped to accomplish the following: proper political representation for Darfur, economic and social development within the region, and an end to Khartoum policies pitting rebel groups against one another (Abuelbashar). All three of these goals were vehemently opposed by Khartoum, already highlighting the tensions that were brought to negotiating tables. Counterintuitively, international mediators set to monitor negotiations restricted rebel groups' jurisdiction and demands exclusively to the region of Darfur, preventing large scale changes from being made within the Khartoum regime (Abuelbashar). These restrictions prevented discussion on ethnic tensions within Sudan, effectively eliminating the root causes of the conflict from being discussed in peace talks.
While the rebel groups were already at a disadvantage, AU mediators further complicated the peace process by dividing talks into subjects that did not align clearly with SLM/A goals, such as Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, and Security Agreements, confusing many negotiators and preventing concrete steps from being taken in regards to peace (Abuelbashar). The result of these confusing talks was the Abuja Agreement, which the AU prevented rebel groups from seeing until 5 days before the signing date -- obviously preventing groups from airing discontent and disagreement with the resolution (Abuelbashar). This, alongside the fact that many of the programs and frameworks contained in the agreement were vague and had no set date for implementation, angered many of the groups who were hopeful for a peaceful end to the conflict.
Groups further felt that the AU adopted the opinions of an international regime, rooted in humanitarian goals and security provisions, before they adopted the goals of groups like the SLM/A which actually had a stake within Sudan (Abuelbashar). As a result, many important details were overlooked, such as rights provided to Darfurians (including compensation for conflict damages, representation, and protection following the demilitarization efforts) and adequate assistance to the region of Darfur following the agreement's sign date (Abuelbashar).
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| Protestors to the 2006 Peace Negotiations in Darfur |
Ultimately, all of these issues culminated in an agreement many rebel groups felt was performative in nature, and did not address any concerns present within Darfur. The SLM/A attempted to remedy some issues with a proposal right before signing, but this too was met with discontent and was turned down by Khartoum and the AU (Abuelbashar). Therefore, in the days leading up to and following the rejection of the agreement, protests erupted within IDP and refugee camps, providing ample evidence for the rejection of the Abuja Agreement.
Knowing all of this, it is clear to see where the tensions lie following the attempted Abuja Agreement. Rebel groups felt inadequately represented by negotiators, who served the interests of international actors before the victims in this conflict. With greater insight into the failures of the Abuja Agreement, delegates should be better equipped to discuss peace talks and negotiations within committee, and should be able to rectify or continue to assert the mistakes made in negotiations, depending on which serves the interests of your respective characters better. Obviously, this is one part of a much larger issue, but it is key to the conflict and key to debate, so make sure not to overlook what can be learned from the Abuja Agreement!
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